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In 2005 EU will launch its emissions trading system (ETS) under which energy intensive 
firms within EU may trade carbon emission allowances. This system is by many seen as 
instrumental for EU’s ability to fulfill its Kyoto commitment. At the same time, in what 
seems  to be  an  ambition  to  go  one  step ahead, Germany,  Sweden  and  the UK have 
adopted  national  greenhouse-gas  emission  targets  equal  to  or  below  the  so-called 
Assigned  Amounts  that  EU’s  burden-sharing  agreement  for  2008-12  allots  to  these 
countries.  It  is  shown  here  that  implementation  of  these  policies  means  that  EU’s 
greenhouse-gas  emissions  during  2008-12  would  be  an  increasing  function  of  the 
aggregate  net  sale  of  emission  allowances  by  ETS  firms  in  countries  with  national 
emission  targets.  One  implication  of  this  circumstance  is  that  the  climate  policies 
announced by Germany, Sweden and the UK are incompatible with the burden-sharing 
agreement and the Kyoto Protocol.  
 
JEL Classification: Q28; Q58. 
Keywords: Tradable Emission Permits; Climate Policy. 
 
 
* The author thanks Peter Bohm, Martin Hill, Svante Mandell, and seminar participants at the Swedish 
Institute of Economic Research for comments on earlier versions of this note. Financial support from Knut 
and Alice Wallenberg Foundation and the Swedish Energy Administration is also gratefully acknowledged. 
Comments are welcome at bc@ne.su.se  
  2
1.  Introduction 
 
In  what  seems  to  be  an  attempt  to  go  one  step  ahead  in  adjusting  to  future,  more 
demanding emission reduction requirements Germany, Sweden and the UK have adopted 
national emission targets equal to or below the so-called Assigned Amounts (AAs) that 
EU’s burden-sharing agreement (EU, 1998) allots to these countries for the period 2008-
12. Germany (2003) states a target equal to its allotment while the targets of Sweden and 
the UK are substantially below their allotments.
1 Sweden (2002) articulates an ambition 
to  retire  AA  units  in  the  amount  of  the  difference  between  its  AA  and  its  national 
emissions target. The UK (2000) announces that it may retire, save or sell AA units 
corresponding  to  the  difference  between  its  AA  and  its  national  target.  Obviously, 
countries with national emission targets cannot use the flexible mechanisms of the Kyoto 
Protocol (UN, 1997) to adjust their emission levels.
2 However, also German, Swedish 
and British energy intensive firms will be part of EU’s emissions trading system (ETS) 
that begins in 2005 (EU, 2003a).  
The  ETS  will  begin  with  a  compliance  period  that  runs  from  2005  to  2007. 
Subsequent  periods  will  coincide  with  the  compliance  periods  of  the  Kyoto  Protocol 
(KP). So, the second period of the ETS will span over the years 2008-12. Prior to a 
compliance period, each member state has to allot emission allowances to its ETS firms 
(trading sector). These firms may then trade allowances on a EU wide market. Given a 
well-functioning market such trading would reallocate allowances/emissions across ETS 
firms and thereby also across member states in a way that substantially lowers the costs 
                                                 
1  Sweden  (2002)  states  that  the  country’s  emissions  2008-12  must  not  exceed  five  times  96%  of  its 
emissions in 1990 while its AA equals five times 104% of that level. Corresponding figures for UK are 
80% and 87.5%, respectively (UK, 2000).  
2 To enhance the cost-effectiveness of international climate policy, the Kyoto Protocol allows its Parties (or 
entities  to  whom  they  delegate  the  right)  to  engage  in  International  Emissions  Trading  (IET),  Joint 
Implementation (JI) and Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) activities. Under IET Parties may trade 
AA units (AAUs) multilaterally. Under JI a Party may finance emission-reduction projects in another Party 
and credit its AAU account by the amount of Emission Reduction Units (ERUs) the projects produce. The 
host  country  has  to  debit  its  AAU  account  with  the same  amount.  Under  CDM  a  Party  may  finance 
emission-reduction  projects  in  countries  without  AAs  and  credit  its  AAU  account  by  the  emission 
reductions the UN CDM Executive Board deems the projects have generated, i.e., the amount of Certified 
Emission Reductions (CERs). In addition, the Protocol allows the Parties to save AAUs/ERUs/CERs for 
use in subsequent compliance periods, so-called banking. Finally, the Protocol also allows the Parties to use 
carbon sinks to reallocate emissions reduction requirements over time. However, in this paper we abstract 
from the use of sinks. This omission has no principal effects on the analysis below.  
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of  attaining  the  overall  ETS  emissions  cap.  For  the  first  compliance  period  this  cap 
amounts to the sum of the allowances the member states allot to their ETS firms. During 
the second period ETS firms may buy and transform, up to some limit, ERUs/CERs to 
ETS allowances as well as save allowances for use in subsequent compliance periods 
(EU, 2003a, 2003b). This implies that for the period 2008-12 the overall ETS emission 
cap will  equal  the  sum  of  the  national allotments  plus the  ETS  firms’  aggregate  net 
import of ERUs/CERs minus their aggregate net banking of allowances.  
To make the ETS consistent with the BSA and the KP, transfers of ETS allowances 
between ETS firms in different member states during 2008-12 will imply corresponding 
adjustments of the countries’ AAU accounts (EU, 2003a). Hence, to comply with EU’s 
burden-sharing agreement a member state cannot let its non-trading sector (households 
and non-energy intensive firms) emit more than the amount of AAUs the country has on 
its AAU account after the allotment made to its ETS firms. The member state can adjust 
this amount by engaging in IET/JI/CDM and use the banking mechanism of the KP.
3  
A member state  equipped with a national emission target will instead control the 
emissions of its non-trading sector so that the national emissions level meets the target 
level. How much the emissions of the non-trading sector must be reduced will depend on 
how much the trading sector emits and thereby on the allowance price, a variable outside 
the control of an individual member country. This circumstance is likely to increase the 
costs of the country’s climate policy. First, the realized allowance price and the “carbon 
prices” that entities in the non-trading sector must pay will most likely deviate from the 
pair of carbon prices the government would have induced, had it not been obliged to 
participate  in  the  ETS.  For  studies  on  how  the  ETS  affects  the  costs  of  individual 
countries’ climate policies see, e.g. Hill and Kriström (2002) and Nilsson and Kriström 
(2002). Second, since the emissions level of the trading sector will not be known with 
any higher degree of certainty before the end of the compliance period the government 
may be forced to over-regulate the non-trading sector or to induce additional emission 
reductions  with  such  a  short  notice  that  many  low-cost  adjustments  are  no  longer 
                                                 
3 The government may trade on the behalf of entities in the non-trading sector or delegate to these entities 
the right to engage in IET/JI/CDM.  
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available.  For  a  discussion  about  other  interaction  effects  between  ETS  and  national 
climate policies, see e.g. Sorrell and Sijm (2003). 
This  note  identifies  another  important  interaction  effect,  namely  that  EU’s 
greenhouse-gas emissions will be an increasing function of the aggregate net sales of 
allowances by trading sectors in countries with national emission targets. As explained 
below, this circumstance implies, among other things, that if Germany, Sweden and UK 
stick  to  their  announced  climate  policies  they  would  either  fail  to  comply  or  “over 
comply”
4 with the burden-sharing agreement, depending on whether the aggregate net 
sale  of  allowances  by  these  countries’  trading  sectors  is  positive  or  negative.  As  a 
consequence, EU would either fail to comply or over comply with the KP.  




2.  Analysis 
  
In order to study interaction effects between national – or countrywide – emission targets 
and participation in the ETS we have to distinguish EU member states equipped with 
such targets from other member states. Let country C represent the former group and 
country O the latter group, and let  i q  denote the AA the burden-sharing agreement (BSA) 
gives  country  i  (i=C,  O)  under  the  KP.    In  addition,  let  T
i q   be  the  amount  of  ETS 
allowances country i allots to its trading sector for the period 2008-12. Finally, let  T
i y  be 
the net import of ERUs/CERs by trading sector i, and  T
i b  its net banking of allowances. 
Now,  we  can  state  trading  sector  C’s  (O’s)  holding  of  allowances  after  trade  with 

















O b y q q - + = ~  
                                                 
4 By this term is meant a situation where countries’ emission levels fall below their adjusted AAs whereby 
there exist AAUs that are not used to cover emissions in the current compliance period, banked/retired by 
these countries, or traded to Parties of the KP.  
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i e  is trading sector i’s emissions during 2008-
12. Given scarcity on allowances, a deterrent penalty for non-compliance,
5 and profit 
maximizing firms, this emission constraint will be binding, implying  
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where trading sector C’s net sale of allowances equals trading sector O‘s net purchase of 
allowances, i.e.,   T
C
T
C e q - ~  = – ( T
O
T
O e q - ~ ). Given information about marginal abatement 
costs (MACs) of the ETS firms it would be possible to calculate the competitive outcome 
on the ETS market. For our purposes, however, it suffices to note that as long as the 
MAC-functions of the ETS firms are increasing in abatements the competitive emissions 
level of each trading sector will be a decreasing function of the competitive allowance 




T q q q ~ ~ ~ + =  
(Montgomery, 1972). 
As indicated in the Introduction, the part of its AA a member state does not transfer to 
its  trading  sector  establishes  an  upper  limit  for  how  much  the  country’s  non-trading 
sector can emit without the country failing to comply with BSA. The member state can 
adjust this limit by engaging in IET/JI/CDM. Letting  T
i i
N
i q q q - =  and  N
i y  ( N
i b ) denote 
the net import (net banking) of AAUs/ERUs/CERs by non-trading sector i, we can state 
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where  0 ³ N
i r  is the amount of AAUs country C is planning to retire, if any. Letting  N
i e  
denote the emissions of the non-trading sector in country i, and presuming that country O 
                                                 
5 EU (2003a) states a penalty of ￿100 per overshooting ton of carbon dioxide emissions and that the 
overshooting amount will be subtracted from the firm’s allowance account in the next compliance period.    
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complies with the BSA, we have that  N
O
N
O q e ~ = . Given this, country O’s total emissions  O e  
are obtained by adding the right-hand part of (2) to (3b)  
  












O O q q q ~ ~ ~ + = . Equation (4) just says that country O‘s total emissions will equal its 
BSA allotment plus net import of AAUs/ERUs/CERs by its non-trading sector plus its 
trading sector’s net purchase of ETS allowances. Guided by its national emissions target 
country C will behave in a different manner, however. Assuming that the government of 
country C will induce emission reductions in its non-trading sector just sufficient to meet 
the national emissions target  C e
_
,
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Although countries with national emission targets cannot adjust their emission levels they 
may still engage in IET/JI/CDM. In fact, this is implied by the climate polices announced 
by Germany, Sweden and the UK. For instance, Sweden (2002) not only states that it will 
bank or retire the difference between its AA and its national emission target but also that 
it will engage in JI and CDM activities, the proceedings of which must be sold, retired or 
banked. Country C’s national emissions target implies the following restriction for its 











So, country C must bank or retire AAUs to an extent that equals the sum of the difference 
between  its  BSA  allotment  and  its  national  emissions  target  plus  any  net  import  of 
AAUs/ERUs/CERs by its non-trading sector.    
                                                 
6 Any other assumption would imply that the national target is not  C e
_
.   
  7
Adding (4) to (5) yields EU’s total greenhouse-gas emissions  
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Equation (7) contains our first result, namely that EU’s emissions of greenhouse gases 
during  2008-12  will  be  an increasing  function  of  trading  sector C’s net  sale  of  ETS 
allowances  ( ) T
C
T
C e q - ~ . The driving force behind this result is the national emissions target 
of  country  C.  To  see  this,  ignore  for  the  moment,  without  loss  of  generality,  the 
possibilities ETS firms have to bank allowances and import ERUs/CERs, and consider a 
situation  where  all  ETS  firms  are  in  compliance.  Then,  by  reducing  (increasing)  its 
emissions by one additional unit, trading sector C will sell (has to buy) an additional 
allowance  to  (from)  trading  sector  O.  The  firm  in  country  O  that  buys  (sells)  this 
allowance will increase (must reduce) its emissions by one additional unit. Thus, this 
transaction does not affect the total emissions of the ETS and all ETS firms are still in 
compliance. However, guided by its national emissions target country C will, due to this 
transaction,  allow  (require)  its  non-trading  sector  to  emit  (abate)  one  additional  unit. 
Hence, no additional emissions reduction (increment) is made in country C as a whole 
when its trading sector sells (buys) an additional allowance. Since trading sector O, at the 
same time, emits (abates) one additional unit, the result is that this transaction increases 
(decreases) EU’s total emissions with one unit.  
A corollary of eq. (7) is that EU’s emissions during 2008-12 will be an increasing 
function of the amount of allowances country C allots its trading sector.
7 Consequently, 
                                                 
7 Assume that the restriction on how many ERUs/CERs that can be transformed to ETS allowances is 
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¶ 1 1 ,  and 
differentiating (7) with respect to  T

















= , where 
i e  is the price elasticity of trading sector i’s demand for allowances. This expression is strictly positive as 







0 . When the relative  
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EU’s  total  emissions  will  differ  from  the  level  O C q e ~
_
+  the  government  of  country  C 
would  expect  with  its  national  emission  target.  Only  if  the  initial  allocation  of  ETS 
allowances happened to be such that there was no net trade between trading sector C and 
trading sector O, would total EU emissions equal that target level.  
Many, if not all, EU countries have domestic policy measures targeting their ETS 
firms’ energy use or emissions of greenhouse gases.
8 In effect, such additional policy 
measures  will  reduce  the  competitive  emission  levels  of  the  targeted  ETS  firms. 
However, as pointed out by, e.g., Sorrell and Sijm (2003) this will merely increase the 
targeted firms’ net sale of allowances while leaving total ETS emissions unaffected. A 
second corollary of eq. (7) is therefore that such additional domestic policies in countries 
with national emission targets will be contra-productive. For any given allotment of ETS 
allowances, the more these polices reduce the emissions of the targeted ETS firms the 
larger will these firms’ net sale be and, hence, the larger will EU’s total emissions be. It 
should also be noted that by lowering the emissions of the trading sector, these policies 
allow  the  non-trading  sector  to  increase  its  emissions  without  breaking  the  national 
emissions  target.  Given  the  common  expectations  of  allowance  prices  that  are 
substantially lower than the carbon price that entities in the non-trading sector pay, the 
effect just mentioned would, as long as the ETS firms’ marginal costs of complying with 
these additional policies are not too high, lower the country’s total abatement costs.  
We now turn to the question what our findings imply for EU’s ability to comply with 
the KP. The KP requires  
 
(8)  O C q q e ~ ~ + £   
 
                                                                                                                                                 
size of trading sector C is small e goes up by almost as much as the increment in  T






would imply  a  smaller impact on the  emissions  during 2008-12 but,  at the same  time,  that  aggregate 
emissions of subsequent compliance periods are correspondingly larger. 
8 For instance, Sweden has (i) a tradable green credit scheme stating how much “renewable” electricity 
retailers must purchase, (ii) subsidies to wind power production, and (iii) “voluntary agreements” between 
the government and energy intensive industries regarding these industries energy use (Sweden, 2002). The 
UK policy includes (I) energy taxation of energy intensive industries, (II) greenhouse-gas emissions trading 
schemes for the industry, and (III) a tradable green credit scheme (UK, 2000). The German policy includes 
support of renewable energy, combined heat and power generation and voluntary agreements between the 
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C C C r b y b y q q + - + - + = ~   and 
inserting (6) we find that (8) holds if and only if  
 
(9)  0 £ - T
C
T
C e q  
 
Inequality (9) says that EU would fail to comply with the KP whenever the net sale of 
allowances by trading sector C is positive. When being negative, EU’s emissions would 
fall below its adjusted AA and there would exist AAUs that are not used to cover EU 
emissions in the current compliance period, banked/retired by country C, or traded to 
Parties of the KP outside the EU. By assumption country O and trading sector C are in 
compliance with the BSA, eqs (4) and (3a), respectively. Thus, it is the non-trading sector 
in country C that fails to comply or over-comply with the BSA requires.  
What  we  have  shown  here  is  that  the  climate  policies  announced  by  Germany, 
Sweden and the UK are inconsistent with the BSA and thereby also with the KP. Of 
course, countries’ as well as firms’ emission levels will be closely monitored whereby 
any tendencies toward non-compliance or over-compliance would likely be detected. The 
policies of Germany, Sweden and the UK would then be adjusted, perhaps long before 
2012. So, the outcome that EU would over-comply or fail to comply with the KP should 
not necessarily be interpreted as a prediction. The point is that such policy adjustments 
would imply that Germany, Sweden and the UK conduct other policies than those they 
have announced.  
To design policies consistent with the BSA, Germany, Sweden and the UK may (a) 
abandon their national emission targets, (b) change their banking/retirement behavior as 
compared to the announced one, (c) engage in IET/JI/CDM in a way that differs from the 
announced behavior, or (d) undertake some combination thereof. Let us first study the 
case where they retain their national emission targets. In terms of country C, this means 
that the adjusted policy satisfies eq. (5). Then, country C could choose any combination 
of (b) and (c) such that the cap implied by (3a) is respected, i.e.,  N
C
N
C q e ~ = . Using (5) to 
eliminate  N
















C C q e q q e ~ ) ~ ( ~ = - + - . After expansion and simplification we get the following 
condition for a policy that is consistent with the BSA 
 













It is easily seen that when trading sector C’s net sale of allowances is positive (negative) 
country C have to bank/retire less (more) and/or import more (less) AAUs/ERUs/CERs 
than it has announced, cf. eq. (6). Only in the event of zero net trade between trading 
sector C and trading sector O would this policy yield the announced behavior. It follows 
immediately from eq. (10) that the more allowances country C allots to its trading sector 
the less will it be able to bank/retire and/or the more AAUs/ERUs/CERs must it import to 
cover emissions of the non-trading sector.  
Now, additional domestic policies targeting ETS firms would not render country C to 
fail to comply or over-comply with the BSA. Instead, by increasing the targeted firms’ 
net sale of allowances, they would reduce the amount of AAUs country C can bank/retire 
and/or increase the amount of AAUs/ERUs/CERs it have to import on the behalf on its 
non-trading  sector.  So,  these  additional  policies  would  reduce  (increase)  country  C’s 
banking account (import expenditures). Again, it should be noted that these additional 
policies  at  the  same  time  are  likely  to  reduce  the  aggregate  abatement  costs  of  the 
country. The net effect may well be a reduction in the country’s total costs. It should also 
be noted that although consistent with the BSA, the policy prescribed by eq. (10) by 
retaining the national emissions target would give rise to the cost-enhancing interaction 
effects mentioned in the Introduction.  
In order to design a policy consistent with BSA that also avoids the drawbacks just 
mentioned,  country  C  would  have  to  abandon  its  national  emissions  target.  Then,  to 
comply with the BSA country C’s emissions must not exceed the sum of the left-hand 
part of (2) and (3a). It should be noted that such a policy could be made consistent with 
any target level for the non-trading sector. The important thing is that this target level is 
independent of the emissions level of the trading sector.  
  
  11
3.  Concluding Remarks 
 
By relying on national emissions targets the announced climate policies of Germany, 
Sweden  and  the  UK  represent  a  regulation  philosophy  that  stands  in  contrast  to  the 
philosophy  behind  EU  ETS  and  the  Kyoto  Protocol.  If  implemented,  the  announced 
policies of Germany, Sweden and the UK would render EU’s emissions during 2008-12 
to be an increasing function of the aggregate net sale of allowances by British, German 
and Swedish ETS firms. One implication of this is that EU would fail to comply or over-
comply with the Kyoto Protocol depending on whether the aggregate net sale of British, 
German and Swedish ETS firms is positive or negative. In other words, the announced 
policies of Germany, Sweden and the UK are incompatible with EU’s burden-sharing 
agreement and the Kyoto Protocol and must be modified. To construct climate polices 
that  are  compatible  with  the  EU burden-sharing  agreement  and  that  also  avoid  other 
costly, unintentional interaction effects discussed above, Germany, Sweden and the UK 
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